Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World)
| Author | : | |
| Rating | : | 4.31 (761 Votes) |
| Asin | : | 0691144311 |
| Format Type | : | paperback |
| Number of Pages | : | 312 Pages |
| Publish Date | : | 2013-07-18 |
| Language | : | English |
DESCRIPTION:
Co-Winner of the 2005 Ranki Prize, Economic History Association"Farm to Factory provides new insights on several key issues and presents a stimulating and wide-ranging perspective on twentieth-century Soviet social and economic history."--Gijs Kessler, International Review of Social History"Robert Allen considers contentions about the costs and achievements of industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture in the USSR."--Paul Josephson, Technology and Culture
Communism Worked, Sort Of - 4.5 Stars R. Albin A very interesting and well argued revisionist history of Soviet economic performance. Allen uses a careful review of the existing economic literature and some economic modeling to examine the relative success or failure of Soviet economic policies. He focuses particularly on the importance of the Stalinist centralized push for rapid industrialization. An important and distinctive feature of this book is Allen's use. pnotley@hotmail.com said 3.5 stars, interesting, but not easy to read The Soviet Union was the perfect failure, so said no shortage of people during and especially after its lifespan. So to argue the opposite, as Robert Allen's new book does, certainly presents a provocative hypothesis. Allen's argument is that from 1928 to 1970, the Soviet Union was one of the world's fastest growing economies, with few rivals in the world. By contrast, the high rate of growth under the last tsars wa. .5 stars, interesting, but not easy to read. The Soviet Union was the perfect failure, so said no shortage of people during and especially after its lifespan. So to argue the opposite, as Robert Allen's new book does, certainly presents a provocative hypothesis. Allen's argument is that from 19"3.5 stars, interesting, but not easy to read The Soviet Union was the perfect failure, so said no shortage of people during and especially after its lifespan. So to argue the opposite, as Robert Allen's new book does, certainly presents a provocative hypothesis. Allen's argument is that from 1928 to 1970, the Soviet Union was one of the world's fastest growing economies, with few rivals in the world. By contrast, the high rate of growth under the last tsars wa. .5 stars, interesting, but not easy to read" according to pnotley@hotmail.com. The Soviet Union was the perfect failure, so said no shortage of people during and especially after its lifespan. So to argue the opposite, as Robert Allen's new book does, certainly presents a provocative hypothesis. Allen's argument is that from 1928 to 1970, the Soviet Union was one of the world's fastest growing economies, with few rivals in the world. By contrast, the high rate of growth under the last tsars wa. 8 to 1970, the Soviet Union was one of the world's fastest growing economies, with few rivals in the world. By contrast, the high rate of growth under the last tsars wa. Good Analysis Russia under Stalin had high growth rates which continued after his death into the mid 70s. From that point on the economy stagnated and its failure to grow was one of the reasons for the collapse of communism. Commentators have made a number of suggestions about the Russian economic performance. They are that the achievements under Stalin were not worth the considerable cost as a capitalist system would have achiev
Here, in a startling reinterpretation, Robert Allen argues that the USSR was one of the most successful developing economies of the twentieth century. A sudden drop in fertility due to the education of women and their employment outside the home also facilitated growth.While highlighting the previously underemphasized achievements of Soviet planning, Farm to Factory also shows, through methodical analysis set in fluid prose, that Stalin's worst excesses--such as the bloody collectivization of agriculture--did little to spur growth. Economic development stagnated after 1970, as vital resources were diverted to the military and as a Soviet leadership lacking in original thought pursued wasteful investments.. He reaches this provocative conclusion by recalculating national consumption and using economic, demographic, and computer simulation models to address the "what if" questions central to Soviet history. Notwithstanding the horrors of Stalinism, the building of heavy industry accelerated growth during the 1930s and raised living standard